The institution of the jury underwent radical change in the United States during the nineteenth century. At the beginning of the century, the jury trial was a form of popular amusement, rivaling the theater and often likened to it.The jury’s ability to find law, as well as facts, was widely if inconsistently defended. The trial’s role as a source of entertainment, and the jury’s ability to nullify, were consistent with a view of forensic oratory that emphasized histrionics, declamation, and emotionally charged rhetoric as means of legal persuasion. By the end of the century, judges had gained more control of the law-finding power, and various questions of fact had been transformed into questions of law. Many of the details that would have aided the lawyers’ dramatic efforts were screened out by a host of new exclusionary rules. The overall effect was to afford less scope for lawyers' emotional excesses — and to make those performances seem disreputable and outmoded. As an institution, the trial continued to figure significantly in American culture through the first three decades of the twentieth century. Numerous factors conspired to weaken the trial’s prominence after that time. Although these changes in forensic style have not usually been considered as a part of that narrative, they may have helped to facilitate the decline of the trial, by reorienting its function away from a broadly representative one, and towards one that emphasized dispassionate analysis in the service of objectivity and technical exactitude, appealing to a rather different community, made up of professional lawyers and those laypersons who could appreciate their values.
The jury’s history is interestingly schizophrenic, even paradoxical. On one side is the history of the jury as palladium of liberty, often along with other such palladia, notably habeas corpus. On the other is the history of the jury as instrument of oppression. On one side is the jury as English, local, indigenous, democratic; on the other is the jury as French, central, foreign, autocratic. This paper reflects on this paradox, regarding it as neither sui generis nor in need of resolution. Instead, it critically analyzes the jury’s schizophrenic history from the perspective of New Historical Jurisprudence, as an illustration of the fundamental tension between two modes of governance, law and police, which ultimately are rooted in the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy that has shaped the conception and practice of government since classical Athens.
Despite the hurdles required to overcome selection effects in analyzing trial results, scholars have studied the effect of judicial ideology and juror race on verdicts. But these variables have never been interacted. Using a two-part selection model and a new dataset of federal civil jury verdicts, this article finds selection effects driven by contingent-fee plaintiff’s attorneys, no effect on verdicts for judicial ideology, and a curvilinear effect of the size of the black population on verdicts.
A judge recently held that a juror's inappropriate tweets during trial were not sufficient grounds to overturn a defendant's criminal conviction for murder. The key point for the judge is that the juror did not tweet about facts in the case. However, the juror did tweet from the jury box and send tweets such as:
In my book, everybody’s guilty until proven innocent.
It will be interesting to see whether this ruling will be upheld on appeal.
Civil jury trials are disappearing. In all courts, both state and federal, there is a decline in both the percentage of cases that go to trial and the absolute number of trials — all while the number of claims is greater than ever before. The civil jury trial is losing its place in America’s justice system, with unfortunate consequences: “The decline in jury trials has meant fewer cases that have the benefit of citizen input, fewer case precedents, fewer jurors who understand the system, fewer judges and lawyers who can try jury cases — and overall, a smudge on the Constitutional promise of access to civil . . . jury trials.” However, despite the many factors contributing to the decline, there may be a way to invigorate the civil jury trial and restore its vital place in America’s justice system. This Comment proposes the adoption of short, summary, and expedited (SSE) civil jury trial programs in response to the decline of the civil jury trial. These trial programs are a faster and cheaper alternative to the traditional jury trial that still retains many of a traditional trial’s key attributes and benefits. An SSE trial program encourages the use of a jury, shortens the time between initiating the lawsuit and a trial, reduces the overall cost of litigation to all parties, and allows attorneys and judges to gain needed experience — without burdening the already existing civil justice system or violating the constitutional promise of jury trials. Unfortunately, few jurisdictions have implemented these programs, and fewer still have done so in a way that supports the traditional jury trial instead of adding yet another way of avoiding it. Scholarship to date on the topic has yet to provide a complete model of an SSE trial program that has the possibility of reviving the jury trial. This Comment remedies this by proposing a model SSE trial program that incorporates the attributes necessary to help revive the civil jury trial.
This Note examines the claim that judges have improperly granted summary judgment where a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. It begins by reviewing the literature on summary judgment, particularly three opinions the Supreme Court issued in 1986, as well as claims about the propriety of summary judgment in fact-intensive civil rights cases. To test these claims, this Note compiles cases where summary judgment was reversed and where a jury trial was held, which together indicate improperly granted summary judgment. Finding a number of such cases, including a higher-than-projected concentration of civil rights cases, this Note concludes by considering implications for civil rights litigation and federal civil procedure.
Almost from the moment the law is set to paper, it is shaped and refined through acts of interpretation and discretion. Police and prosecutors choose which cases to investigate, which to charge and how to charge them. Judges make decisions every day that affect the outcome of cases. These acts of interpretation and discretion are driven by the perspectives of those empowered to make them. All too frequently, they reinforce existing power dynamics. But there are other realms of discretion in criminal law. Whether seeking to apply a legal standard as instructed or engaging in an act of nullification, ordinary citizens serving as jurors engage in unique acts of interpretation, redefining the very concept of the law in terms of their own lived experiences and expectations. In this, jurors serve a democratic function that exceeds their minimalist label as “mere fact finders.”
But in this account of the jury, the people who occupy the jury box matter. To imagine the jury as serving this democratic function is inevitably to turn to a conversation about the identities of the men and women who actually serve as jurors. While courts and scholars speak wistfully of a “representative” jury — one that reflects the community from which it is drawn — this conversation remains dissatisfying, as it seeks to compartmentalize discussions of the jury’s function and the jury’s composition.
This Paper rejects the separation, instead examining the question of the jury’s composition in the context of its proposed function. In the process, a more nuanced theory of jury selection emerges — one that recognizes that while a representative jury matters, the question of what that representation is and precisely why it matters shifts as notions of function shift. The function this Paper explores is the critical interpretive role the jury plays within the democratic lawmaking body. Viewed through this lens, one must first confront the question of precisely which community the jury seeks to represent and how it achieves that representation. In a world in which different communities may bear the disproportional burden of lawmaking and application, different communities may have a different stake in the jury itself. If so, the use of geographically defined jurisdictions to produce venire panels may cease to make sense. Likewise, the value of proportional representation on individual juries, while promoting some functions, may undermine the jury’s democratic viability. Specifically, and perhaps ironically, disproportionate representation on individual juries may actually promote the jury’s democratic function. Even more fundamentally the very definitions of “community” and “identity” become fluid in the context of a democratically driven jury that serves as a forum for citizens to constantly realign their own allegiances as they attempt to apply the law to the defendant and so define the law’s limits in their own lives. In shifting this conversation about jury composition, the possibility of the jury as a unique democratic space emerges.
Outing Batson: How the Case of Gay Jurors Reveals the Shortcomings of Modern Voir Dire
Although scholarly attention has been devoted to the argument that Batson v. Kentucky should apply to gay and lesbian jurors, little or no attention has been paid to how these challenges would work in practice. This article is, foremost, a thought experiment about how peremptory challenges would function if Batson were applied to sexual orientation. I examine several scenarios to understand the practical implications of this change and conclude that it would be ineffective at best and socially appalling at worst. My analysis reveals a fundamental problem with the current peremptory system: it fails to take into account the complex nature of social identity and the psychological realities of human interaction and bias. The goal of equal protection, I suggest, would be better served if changes were made to the existing peremptory challenge system, such as reducing the number of challenges allowed and requiring a Batson-style explanation for every peremptory challenge exercised.